judges and lawyers may not view this as problematic at first blush, and although legal rules do not specifically prohibit this situation, 7 courts should consider how an average citizen may perceive a close relationship between a judge and a juror as a threat to procedural fairness. This Article proposes a categorical rule excluding jurors who have at least a third degree of kinship to the judge. For other relationships (more distant familial relationships or close nonfamilial relationships), this Article suggests that courts utilize voir dire concerning the relationship, require full disclosure by the parties, and employ a balancing test that errs on the side of exclusion.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE NEED TO PROTECT PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS
Underlying the Caperton discussion about whether a judge should be able to preside over a case involving a significant campaign contributor, 8 a deeper question emerged: how to protect public confidence in the courts. 9 At oral argument, counsel for Massey argued that the mere appearance of judicial bias does not violate due process, to which Justice Anthony Kennedy replied: "But our whole system is designed to ensure confidence in our judgments." 10 Justice Kennedy reiterated this sentiment in the majority opinion, quoting a previous discussion that stated, "The power and the prerogative of a court . . . rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments. The citizen's respect for judgments depends in turn upon the issuing court's absolute probity." 11 Thus, a major theme underlying the Caperton majority opinion is that the public will lose confidence in the courts if judges preside over cases involving their own significant campaign contributors. The dissenting Justices acknowledged the importance of protecting public 7. See infra Part III. B. 8. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 , 2266 -67 (2009 (discussing a contribution by Don Blankenship, Massey Coal's Chairman and CEO, to judicial candidate Brent Benjamin as the company was preparing to appeal an adverse $50 million jury verdict). Victorious in the 2004 election, Judge Benjamin twice denied Capterton's recusal motions and reversed the verdict against Massey Coal. Id. at 2257-58. 9. Id. at 2266-67 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
10. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-37, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22) . 11. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266-67 (quoting Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988) ("[I] n determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation of [a judicial recusal statute,] it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process. We must continuously bear in mind that 'to perform its high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'" (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) )).
confidence in the courts, 12 but argued that the majority opinion would foster doubts, not confidence, by encouraging frivolous allegations of judicial bias. 13 Neither the majority nor the dissent defines "public" or explains how public confidence can be fostered through rules governing judicial recusal.
14 In that respect, Caperton is no different than the cases leading up to it. The Supreme Court has frequently used these undefined concepts when explaining that its role is to protect not only justice in fact, but also the appearance of justice by protecting public confidence in the legal system. 15 For example, the Court has held that appointing a special prosecutor with a conflict of interest violates due process-a violation not insulated by harmless-error analysis because of the need to protect public confidence. 16 The Court's judicial-recusal opinions reflect this notion as well, holding that the appearance of bias, rather than actual bias, is the determining factor in such cases. 17 In the context of a judge's financial interest, the Court has held that the 12. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting A., the trial court entered a civil injunction preventing the defendants from infringing the plaintiff's patent. Id. When the plaintiffs began to suspect that the patent infringement was continuing despite the injunction, the plaintiff's attorneys convinced the trial court to appoint them as special prosecutors in the subsequent contempt proceedings. Id. at 791-92. The defendants were eventually convicted of contempt. Id. at 792. The Supreme Court, however, exercised its superintending authority and reversed the contempt convictions because of the special prosecutors' conflict of interest. Id. at 814. In concluding that harmless-error analysis could not apply, the Court emphasized the need to protect public confidence in the courts:
[A]ppointment of an interested prosecutor creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general. The narrow focus of harmless-error analysis is not sensitive to this underlying concern . . . . A concern for actual prejudice in such circumstances misses the point, for what is at stake is the public perception of the integrity of our criminal justice system. " [J] ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice," and a prosecutor with conflicting loyalties presents the appearance of precisely the opposite. Society's interest in disinterested prosecution therefore would not be adequately protected by harmless-error analysis, for such analysis would not be sensitive to the fundamental nature of the error committed. Id. at 811-12 (citation omitted) (quoting Offutt, 348 U.S. at 14).
17. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864-65 (1988) ; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) . It was not always clear in the early cases that the mere appearance of impropriety was a significant constitutional consideration in cases concerning judicial conduct. The right to an impartial judge is not an explicit constitutional right, but is implicit in the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) . The Court has recognized the common law rule that a judge may not preside over a case in which he or she has "a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest." Id. at 523. The Court also explained that the Framers intended for "'[n]o man . . . to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.'" Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55-56 (James mayor of a municipality cannot preside over criminal cases if the municipality's treasury would benefit financially from convicting the defendants. 18 In a similar, though less direct, example involving a judge's financial interest, the Court held that a state supreme court judge could not preside over a lawsuit that closely resembled a prior lawsuit brought by the judge. 19 Outside the context of a judge's financial interest, the Court has also held that a judge may not sit as both the "one-man grand jury" that charges a person with a crime and the presiding judge in the same person's trial.
20
In these cases, the Court emphasized that reversal does not rely on whether justice has been served in the ultimate outcome of the case; 21 rather, even if justice likely was served, reversal may be required because the circumstances did not satisfy the appearance of justice and therefore harmed public confidence.
22 These cases culminated in Caperton, which applied the previous Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894)). However, this did not clarify whether the appearance of impropriety alone could create a due-process violation. In fact, most questions involving judicial disqualification were historically for the legislature to decide and "did not rise to a constitutional level. " FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948) (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523). Moreover, the traditional common law rule did not permit "disqualification for bias or prejudice" because "'the law [does] not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.'" Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361). 18. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. In Tumey v. Ohio, the mayor of a village presided as judge over cases in which citizens were accused of illegally possessing alcohol. Id. at 516. The mayor's salary was supplemented for convicting people of these alcohol offenses, and the proceeds from fines resulting from such convictions were placed into a treasury fund for the village. Id. at 516-17, 519. The Court concluded that these financial incentives resulted in a due-process violation because the mayor had both a direct and an indirect incentive to convict people. Id. at 532-33. In a similar case years later, the Court found a due-process violation even though the mayor did not directly benefit. Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57, 58-59 (1972) .
19. See Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 823. In this case, a state supreme court justice's lawsuit claiming that an insurance company had refused to compensate an insured in bad faith. Id. The justice then presided over a very similar lawsuit in the state supreme court and voted against the insurance company. Id. at 818. The Supreme Court held that this violated due process because the justice's vote in the state supreme court aided his own financial interests in his lawsuit. Id. at 825.
20. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 133 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 21. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259-62 (holding that the campaign contributions required recusal and invoking the need to protect both the appearance of justice and the public confidence in the courts).
22. See, e.g., Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825 ("We make clear that we are not required to decide whether in fact Justice Embry was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case then before the Supreme Court of Alabama 'would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.'" (quoting Ward, 409 U.S. at 60)); Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 ("Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'" (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954))); Tumey, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a consideration as [Vol. 61:429 recusal standards to the factual context of judicial campaign contributions.
23
Although the Court has repeatedly raised concern for protecting public confidence, the Court has never offered a detailed analysis of who "the public" is and how judicial decisions protect the public's confidence. Indeed, without such explanation, any case that relies on a public-confidence argument is vulnerable to attack based on Chief Justice John Roberts's dissent in Caperton, which argued that public confidence is harmed, not helped, by Supreme Court decisions affirming claims of potential partiality or bias, because such decisions will encourage additional (possibly frivolous) claims. 24 To evaluate that point, courts need a better framework for analyzing public-confidence arguments. Scholarly commentary on Caperton, however, has yet to provide such a framework.
25
$12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it; but the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice."). The Court in Caperton acknowledged that the justice had subjectively inquired into the possibility of his own bias and had found none, and refused to question this finding. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262-63. The Court expressly stated that it would not attempt to "determine whether there was actual bias. " Id. (noting that the Court would not attempt to "determine whether there was actual bias").
23. 129 S. Ct. at 2265. Although Justice Kennedy's opinion relied on principles similar to those underlying past decisions, it contained a subtle linguistic distinction from the previous recusal cases and from most state judicial-recusal codes. State codes generally require recusal when there is an appearance of bias-when a judge's "'impartiality might reasonably be questioned.'" See id. at 2266 (quoting W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (2011)). However, Justice Kennedy declined to hold that violating this standard constituted a due-process violation and noted that "most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without resort to the Constitution." Id. at 2267. Justice Kennedy noted that the due-process violations required a "probability of actual bias" or "serious risk of actual bias," rather than the mere appearance of bias. behavioral-science data in various contexts to conclude that people do not have sufficiently accurate knowledge of specific criminal laws to facilitate such a deterrent effect. 32 The same knowledge requisite is necessary to foster public confidence through judicial opinions because, if the general public does not know about a judicial decision, then the opinion cannot foster public confidence in the court system. To be sure, some highly salient court decisions on controversial subjects are widely known, and even less salient decisions are known by some segments of the population. 33 But even then, mere knowledge of a judicial decision does not always cultivate confidence.
34
A second problem with trying to foster broad-based public confidence through judicial decisions is the difficulty of identifying what triggers confidence in the courts. 35 One might relate "confidence" to agreement with court decisions, based on the commonsense notion that people have confidence in courts if they like the outcomes courts reach. But this approach yields problems; most high-profile decisions involve highly controversial social or political issues and thus will displease a significant percentage of the population.
36 Indeed, as courts perform one of their proper roles as sometimes counter-majoritarian institutions, they will make decisions that are unpopular with a majority of the general public.
37 Therefore, it makes little sense to assess public confidence in the courts by assessing whether courts are reaching popular outcomes.
The problem stretches beyond the courts' resolution of controversial issues. As Professor Richard Fallon has noted, it is difficult to ascertain whether a collective notion of public confidence in the courts exists when even close court observers do not collectively agree on the proper extent and use of courts' power. 38 Members of the academic community broadly disagree about core aspects of the courts' role and how courts should carry out such obligations.
39
To name only one example, strong disagreement arises regarding the proper methodology for constitutional interpretation, specifically When court decisions touch on such controversial issues, it will be difficult for such decisions to foster broad public confidence.
Overall, then, there are good reasons to doubt whether courts, through judicial opinions, can broadly affect the general public's confidence in the legal system. From that perspective, the public-confidence arguments used by both the majority and the dissent in Caperton appear hollow. The general public probably does not know about the Caperton decision or understand the majority's opinion, which undermines the Court's rhetoric about fostering public confidence. Even if Caperton is one of the rare highly salient opinions that the national media widely reported to the general public, such media coverage may be inaccurate or may fail to communicate the Court's intended message in a way that builds public confidence. Likewise, the dissent's assertion that the decision will reduce public confidence by leading to an increase in unfair recusal motions seems problematic, as it is unlikely that the general public will ever know about this development. 41 Even a very large increase in recusal motions probably would not attract significant media attention, especially not the kind of attention that an average person in the general public would notice.
42
But a different conception of public confidence leads to different conclusions. Instead of focusing on the "general public," courts should target those directly involved in or observing specific cases, 43 and instead of focusing on the outcomes of cases involving controversial social issues, courts should focus on basic procedural fairness. Reviewing data from survey participants who had personal interactions with the court system, Professor Tom Tyler identified four elements of procedural fairness that affect people's confidence in the courts: 1) "an opportunity to state their case to legal authorities"; 2) the outward neutrality of the decision maker; 3) the dignity, respect, and politeness with which they are treated; and 4) the impression that the authorities are "benevolent and caring," and trying to act in the public interest. 45 The concern for procedural fairness cuts across race, ethnicity, and economic status. 46 Furthermore, the surveys revealed that people care more about procedural fairness than they do about ultimate outcomes, and that issues of procedural fairness related centrally to the reactions of the losing parties.
47 Therefore, a losing party who believes court procedures were fair is much more likely to accept the outcome of the case. 48 The empirical research also examined whether public confidence in the courts is declining and how it can be improved. 49 Tyler concluded that some survey data makes it "tempting" to conclude that public confidence in the courts is declining, but that ultimately there is insufficient evidence to support that general conclusion. 50 However, he does acknowledge that public confidence in all courts, particularly the Supreme Court, is low, and has been low for several decades.
51
Tyler uses this data to argue that public confidence in the courts can be improved by "designing court procedures that lead the people who personally deal with the courts to have positive experiences."
52 Such efforts can focus not only on the litigants in specific cases, but on other members of the public who participate in the court system, such as witnesses, jurors, and litigants' family members. Tyler recommends that "[c]ourts should emphasize their position as neutral authorities whose role is to interpret and apply the law. The belief that courts make decisions based upon the neutral application of principles to the facts of particular cases is central to the legitimacy of courts." 53 Such a framework proves useful in analyzing public-confidence arguments like those in Caperton. Under this framework, the majority opinion seems REV. 163 (1997) likely to foster the confidence of people participating in the court system.
54
People will be impressed with the impartiality and integrity of a judge who recused herself because a party had been a significant campaign supporter, whereas the refusal to recuse in such circumstances runs a great risk of fostering the view that the courts are vulnerable to improper influence. 55 This is the kind of core aspect of procedural fairness that relates centrally to people's confidence in the courts.
When "public" refers to participants in a particular case, and courts seek to uphold procedural fairness, the dissent's argument in Caperton-that an influx of recusal motions will weaken public confidence 56 -seems less convincing. It seems implausible that the participants in a case would lose much confidence in the court due to mere recusal motions, and that minimal impact would pale in comparison to the significant impact a judge could have by choosing to recuse him-or herself under circumstances like those in Caperton. Viewing the concept of public confidence in this manner, the majority in Caperton appears to have the better argument.
Thus, in writing opinions and conducting cases before them, courts can influence public confidence through fair procedures that will resonate with people who directly participate in court proceedings. 57. Realistically, fostering public confidence through individual litigants is an uphill battle, because the system's institutional structure is, in many respects, inherently alienating. Access to the legal system often relies on the ability of individuals to hire a lawyer; indeed, the rules and procedures governing the system assume that litigants will have legal representation. Russell Engler, And Justice For All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 , 1988 (1999 . But in reality, self-representation is now the norm in many kinds of cases. Id. at 1987-88 . Pro se litigants face extraordinary barriers to successfully pursuing their claims, including: legal rules that are difficult to understand and navigate, court personnel who are prohibited from providing legal advice, and busy judges have minimal time to explain proceedings to pro se litigants. See id. at 1988-89.
Even litigants who are able to afford a private lawyer or who receive state-appointed representation may find the legal system inaccessible and alienating, as a lawyer prepares written pleadings typically with minimal client assistance and often speaks in court while the client remains silent. Furthermore, attorneys communicate with opposing counsel and court personnel on the client's behalf. Moreover, lawyers and judges often have professional friendships and use a common jargon-laden language that those outside the profession may not understand.
Racial and ethnic minorities in particular enter the system with a preexisting-and not necessarily unjustified-sense of distrust and injustice. BENNACK, supra note 1, at 30 (showing that 33.5 percent of non-Hispanic whites, 28.6 percent of Hispanics, and 17.7 percent of African Americans "strongly agree" that " [j] udges are generally honest and fair in deciding cases").
throughout the legal process, such procedures may have a substantial, broad-based impact on public confidence.
III. WHAT TO DO WHEN THE PRESIDING JUDGE HAS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
WITH A JUROR Every day in courts around the country, people with close relationships to the presiding judge in a case report for jury duty. Although no empirical data exists examining how frequently this occurs, commonsense suggests that it happens with some frequency, especially in smaller communities with fewer judges and limited jury pools.
Despite this inevitable occurrence, constitutional texts, statutes, and ethical rules provide little guidance as to how this situation should be addressed.
A. Constitutional Provisions on Qualifications for Jurors and Judges
Juror qualifications are governed by the U.S. Constitution's Sixth Amendment, which states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."
58
A similar, though not identical, provision in the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial in certain civil cases.
59
These provisions do not regulate relationships between jurors and judges. The Sixth Amendment states only that the jurors must be "impartial," but does not specify whether impartiality should be measured by objective factors, such as whether the juror is related to another participant in the case, or by more subjective factors revealed during voir dire, such as the juror's subjective views about various matters related to the case and the legal system. 60 The Seventh Amendment does not use the term "impartial," and thus provides even less guidance on what factors should be considered in determining whether a Nearly seventy percent of African Americans in the study believed that courts treated African Americans worse than whites and Hispanics, and forty percent of whites and Hispanics agreed. juror is qualified. 61 Thus, the jury-trial guarantees of the Constitution do not specify any juror qualifications addressing a juror's relationship to the judge.
The constitutional provisions for judicial qualifications are even less specific. Unlike the right to trial by jury, the right to an impartial judge is not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and has instead been read into the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process by the Supreme Court.
62 This due-process provision does not specifically enumerate the qualifications required of judges.
63
Thus, although there is a constitutional right to an impartial jury 64 and a constitutional right to an impartial judge, 65 the Constitution does not specifically speak to whether a juror and the judge may have a close personal relationship.
B. Statutory and Ethical Rules on Qualifications for Jurors and Judges
Legislatures in every state have passed laws delineating qualifications for jurors and judges. 66 However, these laws mainly regulate jurors' and judges' relationships to the parties or the issues in a case, not the relationship between the judge and juror.
67
As to juror qualifications, legislatures around the country have created statutes and rules specifying when a juror should be disqualified based on his or her relationship to a participant in a given case.
68 These statutes and rules focus on the relationship of the juror to the parties, and his connection to or interest in the case. Texas) direct a judge to recuse herself if the judge or the judge's relative is related to a party, attorney, or person likely to be a material witness. 75 The American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E), provides:
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: . . . . (c) the judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; (d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or trustee of a party; (ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) is known by the judge to have more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; (iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding . . . .
76
Some states have used this model code to form judicial disqualification rules; for instance, the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct directs a judge to recuse himself if the judge is related to another judge who has presided over the same case. 77 The Ohio Code specifically provides for recusal when "[t]he judge knows that the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person has acted as a judge in the proceeding."
78
Despite such regulations on relationships with other judges, case issues, or financial interests, neither the statutes nor rules governing juror and judicial qualifications answer whether a judge and juror may have a close relationship to each other.
C. Cases Addressing Related Jurors and Judges
In addition to the lack of textual guidance from constitutional provisions, statutes, or ethical rules, very little case law addresses judges who have a close relationship with a juror. 79 Instead, the vast majority of cases addressing qualifications of jurors focus mainly on ensuring that jurors have no bias toward or relationship with any of the parties, lawyers, or witnesses. 80 464-66 (6th Cir. 1988 ) (affirming juror's removal because juror's wife was seen talking to the defendant and hugging the defendant's wife) ; State v. Kauhi, 948 P.2d 1036 , 1040 -41 (Haw. 1997 ) (finding that failure to excuse a juror who worked as a prosecutor in the same office as the prosecution resulted in the defendant's use of his last premeptory challenge); Taylor v. State, 656 So.2d 104, 111 (Miss. 1995) (explaining that a for-cause juror challenge was improperly overruled because the juror's sibling was an assistant state's attorney) ; State v. Sanchez, 901 P.2d 178, 183-84 (N.M. 1995 ) (noting that a juror's tenuous relationship with prosecutors was insufficient to disqualify her).
81. See supra note 80.
Only three appellate courts-two state supreme courts and one state court of appeals-have addressed the issue. 82 All three held that the juror who had a close relationship to the judge served in error, and reversed the judgment without providing a detailed constitutional analysis. 83 In State v. Tody, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the judge erred by allowing his mother to serve on the jury; however, the six-justice panel disagreed as to the rationale and produced two split opinions. 84 One opinion invoked, but did not extensively analyze, the state and federal constitutional jury provisions, and held that the judge's mother was "objectively biased" because she had "an interest in the case, namely her familial relationship with the judge, that is extraneous to the evidence on which the jury is to base its decision," and which she "would not have been able to set aside . . . when discharging her duties as a juror." 85 The second opinion concluded that there was no constitutional violation, but that reversal was necessary because the trial judge failed to invoke his "broad inherent authority . . . to administer justice" by either recusing himself or striking his mother from the jury.
86
The Arkansas Supreme Court and the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court reached the same result in similar cases, but with even more truncated analyses. 87 Both courts reversed verdicts reached by juries on which the judges' wives served. 88 In support of their rulings, both courts invoked arguments for the appearance of propriety and constitutional jury rights, but neither elaborated on these reasons in any depth.
89

D. The Constitutional Problem Created by a Juror with a Close Relationship to the Presiding Judge
Despite the rather sparse constitutional analysis in the case law, there is, in fact, a serious constitutional concern when a presiding judge and a juror share a close relationship. It is true that judges and juries are both expected to act as neutral and impartial entities; based on this expectation, there may be an assumption that no constitutional problem arises when a relationship exists between these two neutral entities. However, the focus on neutrality overlooks the framers' intent concerning the right to trial by jury.
90
The framers were concerned not only with the jury's neutrality to the parties in a case, but also with the jury's independence from the presiding judge.
91
That concern stemmed from the English common law history of judicial tyranny, when judges in the seventeenth century were essentially puppets of the monarchy and served at the pleasure of the King.
92
Although juries existed, they were often aggressively influenced and intimidated by the monarch's hand-picked judges and faced possible punishment for disagreeing with the monarch's desired result. 93 Eventually, English statutes and courts provided legal measures to insulate jurors from judicial intimidation and influence. 94 This shift is illustrated in the famous Bushell's Case of 1670, in which jurors were imprisoned for refusing to follow the trial judge's directions to convict the defendants of illegal assembly. 95 Bushell, one of the jurors, petitioned for writ of habeas corpus and argued that the jury had a right to reach a verdict contrary to the judge's directions. 96 The Court of Common Pleas sided with Bushell and held that Bushell could not be punished for defying the trial judge's orders regarding the verdict because the jury had a right to act independently from the judge. (1849) ("Timid juries, and judges who held their offices during pleasure, never failed to second all the views of the crown. And as the practice was anciently common of fining, imprisoning, or otherwise punishing the jurors, merely at the discretion of the court, for finding a verdict contrary to the direction of these dependent judges, it is obvious that juries were then no manner of security to the liberty of the subject.").
94. Later, in 1701, the English government codified this idea by enacting a statute providing for judicial independence from the King.
98
American colonial judges, however, continued to serve the King 99 until the Declaration of Independence provided for judicial independence.
100
The framers separated the judge and the jury as two wholly independent institutions based, in part, on this English common law history.
101 Like the court in Bushell's Case, Alexander Hamilton believed that the jury should serve as "a defence against the oppressions of an hereditary monarch," and, as such, must remain independent of judges too often subservient to the monarch.
102 Therefore, Hamilton emphasized that providing the right to a jury, separate and independent from the judiciary, created a "double security" against corruption:
[T]he trial by jury must still be a valuable check upon corruption. It greatly multiplies the impediments to its success. As matters now stand, it would be necessary to corrupt both court and jury; for where the jury have gone evidently wrong, the court will generally grant a new trial, and it would be in most cases of little use to practice upon the jury, unless the court could be likewise gained. Here then is a double security; and it will readily be perceived, that this complicated agency tends to preserve the purity of both institutions. By increasing the obstacles to success, it discourages attempts to seduce the integrity of either. The temptations to prostitution which the judges might have to surmount, must certainly be much fewer, 537, 555-56 (1943) . This history led Blackstone to describe the jury as a separate and independent check on a judiciary too closely connected to the monarchy:
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely intrusted to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and dignity. It is not to be expected from human nature, that the few should always be attentive to the interests and good of the many. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *379.
99. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 109 (1998) .
100. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 11, 20 (U.S. 1776) ("He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices . . . .").
101. See Regnier, supra note 90, at 779-82 (describing the framers' "willing[ness] to improve [the legal system] in ways that would align with their new vision of government" and their interest in renewing the idea of an indepdendent jury).
102. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 456 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894).
while the co-operation of a jury is necessary, than they might be, if they had themselves the exclusive determination of all causes. 103 The U.S. Supreme Court incorporated this understanding of juries into its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. 104 According to the Court:
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.
105
Justice Antonin Scalia, discussing whether an allegedly independent judiciary provides sufficient protection for the individual against state overreaching, wrote that "[j]udges, it is sometimes necessary to remind ourselves, are part of the State." 106 The Court thus has incorporated the framers' intent that the judge and jury be considered two separate institutions, and that juries must be able to exercise independent judgment shielded from judicial influence. 107 Thus, there is a significant constitutional problem with a juror having a close personal relationship with the presiding judge, as it cannot be assumed that the jury is truly separate and independent from a possibly biased judge in such instances.
108 Rather, when a juror has a close relationship to the judge, the very problem the framers sought to avoid arises-that is, there is a greater likelihood that the jury will defer to the judge and fail to act as an independent decision maker. 109 This is problematic, not because it contravenes the framers' intent, but also because it weakens the basic procedural safeguards that shape average people's perceptions of the legal system. Moreover, as discussed in the next section, these concerns are not merely matters of perception. The risk of improper judicial influence on jurors is more prevalent than one might think. 110 Courts have long recognized that jurors are likely to be influenced by even subtle and unintentional cues from the judge. 111 When a juror knows the judge well, it is even more likely that the juror will pick up on and follow even unintentional cues. Most judges seek to uphold strict standards of propriety in their dealings with jurors, 113 and thus may believe that judges and jurors acting in good faith will not allow their close personal relationship to taint the fairness of the proceedings. Although this is certainly an admirable aspiration, it understates the extent to which a judge can unconsciously influence jurors, and the extent to which jurors will defer to even subtle judicial influence.
The Supreme Court has recognized that jurors naturally look to the judge for guidance, and are easily swayed by the judge's words and actions. 114 The Court has stated that a judge's "lightest word or intimation is received [by the jury] with deference, and may prove controlling." 115 Because of jurors' profound sensitivity to the judge's views about a case, courts around the country have concluded that a judge's comments or actions revealing favor to one of the parties can require reversal of a judgment. 116 As a result, trial judges "must make every effort to avoid words or actions that the jury could conceivably interpret as expressing any opinion on the evidence or any partiality to one side." 117 In one case, for example, a Colorado appellate court reversed a criminal conviction because the trial judge escorted the prosecution's witness, a child, to the witness stand. 118 The court reversed the conviction because the jury "could have perceived the trial court's action as an endorsement of the child's credibility." 119 The court stated that trial judges "must be free of even the appearance of bias and partiality." 120 Other courts have similarly reversed decisions by trial judges who were seen giving candy or treats to child witnesses after his or her testimony. 121 The cases are not limited to trial judges' conduct with child witnesses in sexual-assault cases. A Florida appellate court reversed a conviction based on an even slighter appearance of partiality-a handshake and brief conversation between a trial judge and a state's witness, which occurred in front of a jury. 122 Similarly, a North Carolina appellate court reversed a criminal conviction because the trial judge "turned his back to the jury for forty-five minutes during the defendant's testimony on direct examination." 123 In the same vein, numerous appellate courts and the American Bar Association (ABA) have criticized the practice of judges questioning witnesses in front of the jury or commenting on the evidence. 124 ABA standards particularly emphasize the independent role played by the jury and "the uniquely influential position of the trial judge." 125 Fears of judicial influence on juries extend to nonverbal communication, and even unintentional communication. 126 The Alabama Supreme Court once expressed "that facial expressions, gestures, and nonverbal communications which tended to ridicule defendant and his counsel, could, standing alone, operate so as to destroy the fairness of a trial."
127 Social-science research, in legal and non-legal contexts, suggests that judges likely communicate their impressions and expectations to juries in subtle and unintentional ways, 128 and that the expectations influence juries' decision making. 129 Compounding this danger, jurors naturally crave the judge's guidance during the decision-making process:
[J]urors, like most people, respond to unfamiliar surroundings by looking for clues about how to behave and what to think. Because the judge is the authority figure and the figure with the most prestige in the courtroom, jurors tend to look to the judge for those clues.
Having sought and then received those clues from the trial judge, jurors will do their best to follow them, seeking to avoid the feeling that they have not done their jobs properly or the feeling that they have somehow disappointed the judge; jurors, like most people, aim to do a good job and to please those in a position of authority.
130
Thus, there is little question that judicial influence-even if subtle and unintentional-poses great risk to a juror's neutral decision making, because jurors search for indications of the judge's views, the judge communicates his or her views, and jurors perceive and follow the judge's views.
131
These dangers are more prevalent when a judge has a close relationship with one of the jurors; in such a situation, the juror is much more likely to perceive the judge's views, either because the juror knows the judge's predispositions and thus can guess which way the judge is leaning, or because the juror is more able to interpret the judge's words, body language, and other subtle communications. For instance, a particular juror in a medical-malpractice case who knows that the judge had a similar traumatic experience might believe that the judge is likely to sympathize with the patient. Similarly, a juror who has a close relationship with the judge might recognize subtle facial expressions or 128. Horwitz, supra note 117, at 856 (noting that judgs "cannot help but form opinions" that a jury could perceive).
129 . See Blanck, Rosenthal & Cordell, supra note 126, supra note 117, at 859. 131 . In many jurisdictions, the judge instructs the jury to disregard any impression the jury has about the judge's opinion in the case. See, e.g., WIS., JI-CRIMINAL § 100 (2004) ("If any member of the jury has an impression of my opinion as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, disregard that impression entirely and decide the issues of fact solely as you view the evidence. You, the jury, are the sole judges of the facts, and the court is the judge of the law only."). However, the assumption that such instructions are effective is arguably a legal fiction: "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Addressing whether judicial influence on jurors can be erased by curative instructions, another judge stated that "'no matter how much we may admonish them not to, jurors do pay a great deal of attention to the person behind the bench. '" Horwitz, supra note 117, at 860 (quoting La Doris H. Cordell & Florence O. Keller, Pay No Attention to the Woman Behind the Bench: Musings of a Trial Court Judge, 68 IND. L.J. 1199 , 1207 (1993 ). Rather than relying on curative instructions, "the key is to avoid the potentially prejudicial conduct in the first place. " Id. at 861. changes in tone of voice as revealing exasperation with a party's attorneys or witnesses.
Once these subtle cues have been sent by the judge, even if unintentionally, and understood by a juror who knows the judge well, that juror is much more likely to trust and follow the cues and decide the case in accordance with them. 132 Or, such a juror may fear the repercussions of reaching a decision that contradicts the judge's views, and feel intimidated by contradicting the judge. 133 Furthermore, there is an additional risk that, outside the courtroom, a juror with a close relationship to the judge will be much more likely to have ex parte conversations about the case, despite prohibitions against this, as mention of the case would be difficult to avoid in social settings. And, as previously discussed, it would be easy for the juror to pick up even unintentionally communicated views from the judge that reveal his or her views about the case, even in brief and casual exchanges.
Finally, in the jury room during deliberations, there is a risk that a juror closely connected to the judge will carry more weight with other jurors. 134 As explained above, most jurors are in an unfamiliar setting and are looking for an authority figure with greater knowledge or experience with the legal system. Other jurors may perceive a juror closely connected to the judge as such an authority figure. If other jurors defer to that juror, then the parties have been deprived of a jury consisting of independent community members. 135 Thus, there are strong constitutional and practical arguments for excluding a potential juror who has a close personal relationship to the presiding judge. However, there is a more fundamental systemic argument that harkens back to Caperton-protecting public confidence in the absolute probity and neutrality of the court system. 136 At a basic level, it does not appear appropriate for the presiding judge to empanel a juror with whom he or she has a close personal relationship. 137 A judge who fails to exclude such a juror will likely create the perception that the judge is not concerned with maintaining absolute probity and neutrality.
138 By contrast, a judge who excludes someone with whom he or she has a close personal relationship will build confidence in case 132. Horowitz, supra note 117, at 850 (discussing a judge's effect on jury instructions). Admittedly, the opposite will be true in some cases. A juror who knows the judge and does not trust the judge's opinion might be inclined to go against the judge.
133. Id. at 859 (discussing even the average juror's desire to please the judge the members of the court upon hearing the facts of the case was that the presence of the circuit court judge's mother on the jury raises red flags of danger of juror bias and of a circuit court judge having to rule on matters involving a member of his or her family.").
138. Cf. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 (noting the apparent prudence of avoiding any possible partiality sua sponte).
participants and observers, who will think that the judge is performing his or her duties with total neutrality and probity.
F. What Specific Rules and Procedures Should Govern Close Relationships
Between the Presiding Judge and a Potential Juror?
Once one accepts that problems arise from a close relationship between the presiding judge and a potential juror, a number of questions arise about how best to respond. If it is impermissible for a jury to include someone who has a close relationship to the presiding judge, should the remedy be exclusion of the juror or recusal of the judge? What type and degree of relationship between a potential juror and the judge should disqualify the juror? If the rule primarily focuses on familial relationships, what degree of kinship triggers disqualification? What about nonfamilial, but close, personal relationships, such as friendships or business relationships? Should exclusion be a categorical rule or a balancing test-or both, based on the type of relationship? If there is a balancing test for some relationships, who should conduct it?
Exclusion of a Juror or Recusal of the Judge
Exclusion of jurors is preferable to recusal for mainly logistical reasons. In small counties, judicial recusal can be very burdensome, in that it often requires a judge from an outside county to travel to a neighboring county and hear the case.
139 Not only is this inconvenient for the out-of-county judge, but it can also potentially delay the proceeding at issue, which is inconvenient to jurors and litigants. In larger communities, more judges may be available, but delays and inconveniences are nonetheless inherent in replacing a judge.
140
Although such logistical burdens may be justified when no other alternative exists, here there is a much simpler alternative: removing the juror. This is not a completely cost-free solution-citizens have an important interest in participating in jury duty, 141 and, therefore, a rule excluding certain people closely connected to a judge in a single-judge county from participating as jurors will prevent them from ever serving on a jury. But, compared to requiring judicial recusal, exclusion of jurors is preferable.
Defining Rules and Procedures for the Exclusion of Jurors
The next step is defining which relationships are, in fact, problematic. As a starting point, it makes sense to define familial relationships categorically in terms of degrees of kinship. Thus, one could imagine excluding relatives at S. 400, 407 (1991) (noting that apart from the ability to vote, "for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process").
either the first degree (parents, children, siblings), the second degree (grandparents and grandchildren), or the third degree (uncles, aunts, nieces, and nephews).
142
Regardless of where the line is drawn, such a categorical rule will be imperfect in some cases; even some typically close familial relationships (such as siblings) will be strained in certain families, and thus will not raise problems of independence from the judge. Similarly, some typically distant familial relationships (such as second or third cousins) will be very close in some families, and thus may raise problems of independence from the judge. Nonetheless, it seems sensible to assume that kinships in the first, second, and third degrees are sufficiently close in most families to raise concerns about independence from the judge.
143
Therefore, jurors who fall within these degrees of kinship should be categorically excluded. Legislatures seeking to craft such a rule need not write on a blank slate: family and intestacy statutes often contain legislative definitions based on degrees of kinship, 144 which may be referenced or incorporated into juror statutes.
145
Certain nonfamilial relationships, such as friendships, business relationships, fiduciary relationships, and employer/employee relationships, will often also be sufficiently close to raise serious concerns about juror independence from the judge. For these nonfamilial relationships, a categorical approach is ineffective because inherent subjectivity is required to determine what constitutes a "close" relationship.
146
For such nonfamilial relationships, judges and jurors should be required to fully disclose the relationship, and the parties should have the right to full voir dire. After voir dire, if a party moves to strike the juror, the judge should conduct a balancing test to determine whether the juror raises concerns about judicial independence. In balancing, judges should consider factors such as the nature and length of the relationship between the judge and potential juror, the time and nature of the most recent contact, whether the judge and the juror are 145. Apart from the question of which jurors should fall within the categorical rule, the additional question arises of whether the judge should strike such jurors sua sponte, or whether the parties should be required to make a motion to strike. The author is currently litigating this issue in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. State v. Sellhausen, 794 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010 ), review granted, 794 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2011 . In that case, we argued in the court of appeals that a sua sponte strike is preferable, because it avoids the need for one of the lawyers to potentially antagonize the judge by moving to strike the judge's family member. A lawyer in that position might understandably fear that the judge, consciously or unconsciously, might take offense to the insinuation that the judge's family member is not an appropriate juror. Such a scenario could lead to problems later in the trial, either because the lawyer advocates less zealously for fear of further antagonizing the judge, or because the judge's leftover hostility toward the lawyer could affect later rulings at trial. likely to see each other in an out-of-court setting during the case proceeding, and whether the judge or the juror believes the relationship could influence the juror's decision making.
Admittedly, requiring the judge to assess his own relationship to a juror presents risks.
147 Some judges would likely be unable to put aside their own subjective view regarding their (and their close associates') ability to rise above any possible prejudice. 148 Other judges might be overly cautious and strike anyone with any conceivable connection to the judge, therefore excluding jurors who, in fact, pose no threat to the jury's independence from the judge.
149
Although not entirely ideal, judicial balancing is probably the best solution compared to the alternative solutions. As indicated above, it is not sensible to categorically prohibit any person with any conceivable connection to the judge, and it is logistically unworkable to suggest that someone other than the judge should conduct the requisite balancing test. 150 At some point, the system must accept that, in these instances, a judge's determination, even though involving someone with whom she has a prior relationship, is logistically necessary.
There is, admittedly, a potential harm to public confidence if the judge concludes that the juror should not be excluded based on the balancing test. However, this harm is minimized by using a transparent voir dire procedure and by requiring a full explanation in open court of the basis for the judge's decision. If such procedures are followed, survey research suggests that public participants and observers will have more confidence in the judge's ultimate decision not to remove the juror. Ct. 2252 Ct. , 2263 Ct. (2009 (acknowledging that the judge who subjectively examined whether he was biased toward his campaign contributor concluded that he was not, and finding this insufficient because of the likelihood that judges are not capable of objectively discerning their own motivations). The Court wrote:
Following accepted principles of our legal tradition respecting the proper performance of judicial functions, judges often inquire into their subjective motives and purposes in the ordinary course of deciding a case. This does not mean the inquiry is a simple one. . . . There are instances when the introspection that often attends this process may reveal that what the judge had assumed to be a proper, controlling factor is not the real one at work. If the judge discovers that some personal bias or improper consideration seems to be the actuating cause of the decision or to be an influence so difficult to dispel that there is a real possibility of undermining neutrality, the judge may think it necessary to consider withdrawing from the case.
Id.
148. See id. 149. Cf. Hayes v. Forman, 568 P.2d 579, 580 (Nev. 1977) (reinstating a judge who had been forced to recuse on the basis of his religion, which was alleged to favor one party).
150. See McKeon & Rice, supra note 146, at 214 (discussing limitations of resources and demands on courts).
151. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
